Parties and roles: Satish Chander Ahuja is the appellant/applicant who initiated or carried the matter to the Supreme Court. Sneha Ahuja is the respondent opposing the relief or defending the challenged action, decision, law or proceeding. The labels “plaintiff” and “defendant” are generally not used here because this is an appellate, special or Supreme Court proceeding. A daughter-in-law lived with her husband in a house legally owned by her father-in-law. During matrimonial conflict, the owner sought possession and argued that because the husband had no title, the premises could not be a shared household. A narrow interpretation would make a woman's statutory residence right depend on her husband's ownership and allow relatives to defeat protection through title arrangements. Procedural and real-world context: Domestic dispute: daughter-in-law claimed right to reside in house owned by father-in-law. | Delhi courts applied the narrow S.R. In simple terms, the Court had to resolve must a shared household be owned or rented by the husband? How does a residence order interact with a third party's ownership and civil suit? Is S.R. Batra correct? The outcome mattered immediately because the Court overruled the restrictive S.R. Batra rule. Procedural setting: Domestic dispute: daughter-in-law claimed right to reside in house owned by father-in-law. | Delhi courts applied the narrow S.R. Batra view. | 15 Oct 2020: Supreme Court broadened 'shared household' and overruled Batra's restrictive interpretation. The central problem before the Court was must a shared household be owned or rented by the husband? How does a residence order interact with a third party's ownership and civil suit? Is S.R. Batra correct? The controversy was considered in the framework of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, ss.2(s), 17, 19 and 26; Code of Civil Procedure, together with Constitution arts.14, 15(3) and 21. The wider importance of the case lies in shared household; residence right; beneficial interpretation; balancing ownership and protection; due process.

Woman: shared household depends on actual domestic living, not ownership; dispossession required due process under the DV Act. | Owner: exclusive title entitled him to possession; the husband's lack of proprietary interest defeated her claim. Competing positions in context: Satish Chander Ahuja's position: as the appellant/applicant, Satish Chander Ahuja sought the relief indicated by the questions of law and challenged the opposing action or interpretation. The claim was that the Court should apply the governing provisions consistently with Shared household; residence right; beneficial interpretation; balancing ownership and protection; due process. Sneha Ahuja's position: as respondent, Sneha Ahuja resisted that relief, defended the impugned measure or decision, or proposed a narrower interpretation of the Court's power and the applicable law. The Court therefore had to test these submissions against Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, ss.2(s), 17, 19 and 26; Code of Civil Procedure and Constitution arts.14, 15(3) and 21, the record of the proceedings and binding precedent. This summary states the principal controversy in accessible language; the official judgment remains authoritative for counsel-specific submissions and paragraph references.

The Court overruled the restrictive S.R. Batra rule. A shared household includes a home where the aggrieved woman lived in a domestic relationship, even if owned by relatives and even without the husband's title. Her right is a right of residence, not ownership, and is not indefeasible: courts must balance it with genuine rights of senior citizens/owners, consider DV proceedings and avoid eviction without lawful adjudication. Effect of the decision: the ruling explains or applies Shared household; residence right; beneficial interpretation; balancing ownership and protection; due process and binds the parties to the operative directions made in Civil Appeal No. 2483/2020. It also guides lower courts and public authorities on materially similar questions under Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, ss.2(s), 17, 19 and 26; Code of Civil Procedure. Scope and caution: only the ratio decidendi and operative directions of the signed judgment are binding; summaries should not be treated as substitutes for the judgment, separate opinions, later review orders or subsequent precedent.

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, ss.2(s), 17, 19 and 26; Code of Civil Procedure

Constitution arts.14, 15(3) and 21

Shared household; residence right; beneficial interpretation; balancing ownership and protection; due process