Parties and roles: Navtej Singh Johar is the petitioner who initiated or carried the matter to the Supreme Court. Union of India is the respondent opposing the relief or defending the challenged action, decision, law or proceeding. The labels “plaintiff” and “defendant” are generally not used here because this is a constitutional writ proceeding. Section 377 IPC criminalized 'carnal intercourse against the order of nature' and enabled persecution of LGBTQ+ persons even when conduct between adults was private and consensual. Beyond prosecutions, its existence legitimized stigma, blackmail and denial of equal citizenship. Petitioners asked the Court to correct Suresh Koushal and recognize sexual orientation as an intrinsic attribute of identity. Procedural and real-world context: 2009: Delhi High Court read Section 377 down. | 2013: Suresh Koushal restored criminalization. In simple terms, the Court had to resolve does Section 377 violate Articles 14, 15, 19 and 21 insofar as it criminalizes consensual same-sex intimacy? Is sexual orientation protected? Should Suresh Koushal stand? The outcome mattered immediately because section 377 was unanimously read down to exclude consensual sexual acts between adults in private; it remains for non-consensual acts, minors and bestiality. Suresh Koushal was overruled. Procedural setting: 2009: Delhi High Court read Section 377 down. | 2013: Suresh Koushal restored criminalization. | 2016: Navtej Johar and others filed fresh petitions. | 2017: Privacy judgment strengthened autonomy claims. | 06 Sep 2018: Five judges unanimously decriminalized consensual adult same-sex relations. The central problem before the Court was does Section 377 violate Articles 14, 15, 19 and 21 insofar as it criminalizes consensual same-sex intimacy? Is sexual orientation protected? Should Suresh Koushal stand? The controversy was considered in the framework of Indian Penal Code, 1860, s.377, together with Constitution arts.14, 15, 19(1)(a), 21 and 32. The wider importance of the case lies in constitutional morality; dignity; privacy; sexual autonomy; non-discrimination; transformative constitutionalism.

Petitioners: criminalization violated equality, dignity, privacy, expression and non-discrimination based on sex; constitutional rights do not depend on numbers. | Union: left constitutional validity to the Court regarding consensual adult conduct, while retaining the provision for non-consensual acts, minors and animals. Competing positions in context: Navtej Singh Johar's position: as the petitioner, Navtej Singh Johar sought the relief indicated by the questions of law and challenged the opposing action or interpretation. The claim was that the Court should apply the governing provisions consistently with Constitutional morality; dignity; privacy; sexual autonomy; non-discrimination; transformative constitutionalism. Union of India's position: as respondent, Union of India resisted that relief, defended the impugned measure or decision, or proposed a narrower interpretation of the Court's power and the applicable law. The Court therefore had to test these submissions against Indian Penal Code, 1860, s.377 and Constitution arts.14, 15, 19(1)(a), 21 and 32, the record of the proceedings and binding precedent. This summary states the principal controversy in accessible language; the official judgment remains authoritative for counsel-specific submissions and paragraph references.

Section 377 was unanimously read down to exclude consensual sexual acts between adults in private; it remains for non-consensual acts, minors and bestiality. Suresh Koushal was overruled. Sexual orientation is constitutionally protected, and LGBTQ+ persons possess equal citizenship, dignity, privacy and expression. Constitutional morality prevails over social morality; the State must combat stigma. Effect of the decision: the ruling explains or applies Constitutional morality; dignity; privacy; sexual autonomy; non-discrimination; transformative constitutionalism and binds the parties to the operative directions made in W.P.(Crl.) No. 76/2016 and connected petitions. It also guides lower courts and public authorities on materially similar questions under Indian Penal Code, 1860, s.377. Scope and caution: only the ratio decidendi and operative directions of the signed judgment are binding; summaries should not be treated as substitutes for the judgment, separate opinions, later review orders or subsequent precedent.

Indian Penal Code, 1860, s.377

Constitution arts.14, 15, 19(1)(a), 21 and 32

Constitutional morality; dignity; privacy; sexual autonomy; non-discrimination; transformative constitutionalism