Parties and roles: Joseph Shine is the petitioner who initiated or carried the matter to the Supreme Court. Union of India is the respondent opposing the relief or defending the challenged action, decision, law or proceeding. The labels “plaintiff” and “defendant” are generally not used here because this is a constitutional writ proceeding. Section 497 IPC punished a man for sexual relations with another man's wife without the husband's consent, but did not punish the married woman and treated her as a victim lacking agency. A husband could effectively consent to or complain of the conduct, while a wife had no corresponding remedy against her husband's partner. The colonial provision treated marriage as male control over female sexuality. Procedural and real-world context: 2017: Petition challenged IPC Section 497. | 2018: Constitution Bench examined equality, privacy and marriage. In simple terms, the Court had to resolve does criminal adultery violate equality and non-discrimination? Does it deny sexual autonomy and dignity? Is criminal punishment necessary to protect marriage? The outcome mattered immediately because section 497 IPC and the related CrPC provision were unanimously struck down. The law stereotyped women as property and denied equal agency. Procedural setting: 2017: Petition challenged IPC Section 497. | 2018: Constitution Bench examined equality, privacy and marriage. | 27 Sep 2018: Adultery offence unanimously invalidated. The central problem before the Court was does criminal adultery violate equality and non-discrimination? Does it deny sexual autonomy and dignity? Is criminal punishment necessary to protect marriage? The controversy was considered in the framework of Indian Penal Code, 1860, s.497; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, s.198(2), together with Constitution arts.14, 15 and 21. The wider importance of the case lies in gender equality; dignity; privacy; sexual autonomy; anti-stereotyping; criminal-law proportionality.

Petitioner: Section 497 was paternalistic, discriminatory and violated autonomy, dignity and privacy. | Union: adultery damages marriage and society and may legitimately be deterred by criminal law. Competing positions in context: Joseph Shine's position: as the petitioner, Joseph Shine sought the relief indicated by the questions of law and challenged the opposing action or interpretation. The claim was that the Court should apply the governing provisions consistently with Gender equality; dignity; privacy; sexual autonomy; anti-stereotyping; criminal-law proportionality. Union of India's position: as respondent, Union of India resisted that relief, defended the impugned measure or decision, or proposed a narrower interpretation of the Court's power and the applicable law. The Court therefore had to test these submissions against Indian Penal Code, 1860, s.497; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, s.198(2) and Constitution arts.14, 15 and 21, the record of the proceedings and binding precedent. This summary states the principal controversy in accessible language; the official judgment remains authoritative for counsel-specific submissions and paragraph references.

Section 497 IPC and the related CrPC provision were unanimously struck down. The law stereotyped women as property and denied equal agency. Adultery may remain a civil ground for divorce and could have consequences in exceptional cases such as abetment of suicide, but the State cannot criminalize consensual adult intimacy merely to enforce marital fidelity. Effect of the decision: the ruling explains or applies Gender equality; dignity; privacy; sexual autonomy; anti-stereotyping; criminal-law proportionality and binds the parties to the operative directions made in W.P.(Crl.) No. 194/2017. It also guides lower courts and public authorities on materially similar questions under Indian Penal Code, 1860, s.497; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, s.198(2). Scope and caution: only the ratio decidendi and operative directions of the signed judgment are binding; summaries should not be treated as substitutes for the judgment, separate opinions, later review orders or subsequent precedent.

Indian Penal Code, 1860, s.497; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, s.198(2)

Constitution arts.14, 15 and 21

Gender equality; dignity; privacy; sexual autonomy; anti-stereotyping; criminal-law proportionality